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Recent empirical research by economists has shown that electoral rules exert a
strong inﬂuence on ﬁscal policy: majoritarian elections are associated with smaller
government spending, smaller budget deﬁcits and smaller welfare states, compared
to proportional elections. This empirical research was motivated by theoretical
work that took the party structure as given and studied the direct eﬀects of
electoral rules on the incentives of politicians.1
For many years, political scientists have stressed the strong inﬂuence of elec-
toral rules on the party structure and type of government: majoritarian elec-
tions are more likely to lead to a two-party system and single-party government,
while proportional elections often produce fragmentation of political parties and
coalition or minority governments. But the political science literature generally
stopped here, and did not study the implications for ﬁscal policy.2
A common theme in economic research on ﬁscal policy is the so-called com-
m o np o o lp r o b l e m :i fd i ﬀe r e n tg r o u p sh a v ep a r t i a lc o n t r o lo v e rs o m ec o m p o n e n t
of government spending, each of them does not fully internalize the ﬁscal costs.
A version of this theory argues that coalition governments, composed of diﬀerent
parties, tend to overspend (or run larger budget deﬁcits) than single-party gov-
ernments. There is also some empirical support for this claim.3 However plausible
this claim may be, it has been derived from rather superﬁcial assumptions. Typ-
ically, the analysis postulates that parties have diﬀerent and exogenously given
policy preferences. Hence, a government supported by a single party behaves as
a unitary decision maker, while a coalition government faces a collective choice
problem. But why should a large single party representing several groups in so-
ciety behave any diﬀerently from a coalition of smaller parties, each representing
the same groups? Moreover, the economic literature on the common pool problem
takes the number of parties (and not only their motivation) as given, with no link
to the electoral rule.
In this paper, we focuses on the missing link: how the party system inﬂuences
public spending through the type of government, coalition vs. single-party. We
1See in particular Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno, 2002, Persson and Tabellini 2003,
2004a, and there references cited in the survey by Persson and Tabellini 2004b.
2See, for instance, Cox (1990, 1997), Laver and Schoﬁeld, 1990, Lijphart, 1984, 1994, 1999,
Powell, 1982, 2000, and Taagepera and Shugart, 1989. Austen-Smith (2000) studies taxation and
government formation under alternative electoral rules, but takes party structures as exogenous.
3See, e.g., the contributions in Poterba and von Hagen, 1999, and in particular the chapter
by Kontopoluos and Perotti.
2show that the indirect eﬀects of electoral rules (on the number of parties and on
the type of government) are central to the ﬁnding that majoritarian elections lead
to less public spending than proportional elections.
Our main theoretical contribution conﬁrms that the distinction between single-
party and coalition governments is indeed central for the size of public spending.
We derive this result in a model where politicians are opportunistic and the parties’
policy preferences are endogenous. The central mechanism is that voters can
discriminate between the parties of a coalition government, while they cannot do
so between diﬀerent factions making up a single party in government. This creates
electoral conﬂicts — an “electoral common pool problem” — within a governing
coalition of diﬀerent parties, but not within a single-party government.4
Given this result, we extend the analysis to endogenize party formation and
the type of government via decisions by primitive groups of politicians to form
large or small parties. Based on simplifying assumptions, we provide an exam-
ple where proportional elections lead to a more fractionalized party system than
majoritarian elections. While we do not pretend to have a general and comprehen-
sive theory from party formation to economic policy choices, the model we present
has sharp and testable predictions: PR induces higher spending than majoritar-
ian elections, but only through more party fragmentation and higher incidence of
coalition government. That is to say, if we hold the type of government constant,
the electoral rule has no direct eﬀect on public spending.
We use this insight to approach political and economic data from up to 50 par-
liamentary democracies in the post-war period. Our estimates rely alternatively
on the cross-country variation in the data, or the within-country variation associ-
ated with electoral reforms. The empirical evidence supports our key theoretical
result, that PR elections induce more government spending, but only indirectly,
via party formation and the incidence of coalition governments. The overall eﬀect
is similar in size to earlier empirical results on reduced form: a full scale reform
from majoritarian to proportional elections, increases overall public spending by
about 5% of GDP.
Section 2 presents and discusses our basic model of policymaking, taking the
number of parties as given. Section 3 develops the equilibrium policy choices
of diﬀerent types of government under proportional elections. Section 4 shows
that the equilibrium under majoritarian electoral rule is identical, as long as the
n u m b e ro fp a r t i e si sn o ta ﬀected. In Section 5, we extend the model, by help of
4A recent and very interesting paper by Bawn and Rosenbluth (2002), to which we owe
considerable inspiration, discusses similar ideas in a less formal framework.
3a simple example, to endogenize party and government formation and to draw
conclusions on the eﬀects of electoral rules on the number of parties and the type
of government. Sections 6 and 7 present the evidence and show that it supports
the theoretical predictions. Section 8 concludes.
2. The model
A population consists of 4 economic groups of equal size, normalized to unity and
indexed by J. Individuals in group J have preferences represented by:
V
J(g)=1− τ + H(g
J) . (2.1)
Individual income is normalized to 1 for all individuals, τ is a lump sum tax
constrained to be non-negative and gJ is a local public good that only beneﬁts
economic group J. H is a well-behaved concave utility function, and g denotes
the vector of policy instruments. The government budget constraint equates total
tax revenue to total spending:
4τ =
X
J
g
J . (2.2)
This is a standard setting of “special-interest” politics (see Persson and Tabellini,
2000, Chapter 7). The vector of policy instruments, g =
£
τ,
©
gJª¤
, induces a
conﬂict of interest among economic groups over the allocation of the (targeted)
spending on local public goods,
©
gJª
.
A benevolent and utilitarian social planner would treat all groups in the same
way and equate the marginal utility of the local public good gJ for a quarter
of the population to the opportunity cost of private consumption for the whole
population. The condition for this is:
ˆ g
J = H
−1
g (1),a l l J, (2.3)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and −1 an inverse function, and where
taxes are residually determined from the government budget constraint (we as-
sume an interior optimum).
Parties and governments We want to compare policy decisions under a coali-
tion government G = C and under a single party government G = S.T o d o s o ,
4we consider two polar cases: (i) a four-party system with P =1 ,2,3,4 where each
party represents5 an economic group, (ii) a two-party system with P =1 2 ,34,
i.e., the parties representing groups 1 and 2 (3 and 4) have merged. In a single
party government, either P =1 2or P =3 4is in power while the other party is
in the opposition. In a coalition government, we assume that either P =1 ,2 are
in government and P =3 ,4 are in the opposition, or vice versa.6
Parties are opportunistic: they care only about winning an upcoming election.
Speciﬁcally, the objective of party P in a government of type G is to maximize
its expected seat share, E(sP
G), where the expectations operator E(·) refers to the
electoral uncertainty described below.
If a single party holds government, policy formation is straightforward: the
party acts in unison and chooses the vector of policy instruments g.I nt h ee v e n to f
a coalition government, we assume that each member of the coalition has unilateral
decision making power over the local public good that beneﬁts the economic group
represented by that party. What about spending on the local public goods that
beneﬁt the groups out of government ? As we shall see, all coalition members
agree about how much to spend on that; thus, for simplicity we assume that a
coin is tossed about who is entitled to choose them. The tax rate τ is residually
determined so as to balance the budget, once all spending decisions have been
made (assuming an interior optimum for the tax rate).
This assumption about the behavior of coalition governments can be inter-
preted as parties obtaining agenda-setting powers — say, in the form of ministerial
positions — over the policy dimensions they care about the most (such powers could
potentially be derived from bargaining over ministerial positions at a government
formation stage, as in Laver and Shepsle, 1996). This agenda-setting power is
strong enough to allow the minister in charge to do what is unilaterally optimal
for her party. This would happen, for instance, if rejection of a policy proposal
led to a government crisis or some very costly outcome for the coalition members,
as in Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) or Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000).
The implication of our assumptions about policy formation will be that coalition
governments, but not single-party governments, face an electoral common-pool
problem in setting policy.
5The precise meaning of “represent” is explained when we describe the election stage below.
6Other combinations of party mergers or coalition governments would deliver the same qual-
itative results as these two polar cases, as will become clear in the analysis to follow.
5Voters We assume that citizens vote retrospectively based on economic consid-
erations, rewarding or punishing the incumbent government as their individual
utility is above or below a given reservation utility. Nevertheless, “ideology” or
“party attachment” plays a role, as voters treat diﬀerently "their own" party com-
pared to the parties that represent other groups. Speciﬁcally, citizen i in group J
votes for party J, when the latter is in government, if:
V
J(g) ≥ ω
i + δ + V
∗J . (2.4)
If the inequality turns the other way, she votes for the opposition; if the opposition
has more than one party, each of these receives her vote with equal probability.
If party J is not in government and inequality (2.4) is satisﬁe d ,t h e ne a c hp a r t y
in the coalition receives her vote with equal probability; if the inequality is not
satisﬁed, she votes for her “own” party J. Voters thus reward their own party
m o r eo f t e nt h a no t h e rp a r t i e s .
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (2.4) depicts an individual component
of reservation utility: ωi is uniformly distributed within each group of voters,
with mean zero and density φ. Individuals with higher values of ωi are more
demanding of the incumbent government. The second term is a random shock to
the popularity of the incumbent government, common to all voters. We assume
that δ is also uniformly distributed, with mean 0 and density ψ. Thus, we can
think of φ as a measure of within-group voter mobility, and ψ as a measure of
aggregate mobility between government and opposition (higher values correspond
to higher mobility). The last term is given by V ∗J = V J(g∗
G), where g∗
G denotes
the equilibrium policy vector for a given type of government. It reﬂects the voters’
expectations of what governments can reasonably be expected to deliver, given the
political circumstances in which policy is set. When the incumbent government
sets policy, it knows the distributions for ωi and δ, but not the realization of
the aggregate popularity shock δ. As in other probabilistic voting models, this
uncertainty creates a smooth mapping from policy to expected vote shares and
seat shares.
These speciﬁc assumptions about voting behavior can be generalized in several
ways, without altering the nature of the results. Two assumptions are central to
our argument, however. First, voters are not fully intertemporally rational, and
not modeled as strategic players. We are not too apologetic about this. Instances
of strategic voting are certainly be observed in the real world. However, given the
low individual stakes for a single atomistic voter, sophisticated strategic voting
is not necessarily more plausible than simple retrospective voting. On the other
6hand, we believe that it is much more important to model professional politicians
as fully rational and strategic.
The second central assumption is that voters reward only their own party
(rather than the whole coalition) when they are pleased with government per-
formance. Again, the speciﬁc model of this behavior is not so important. The
important notion is that some voters, at least, are ideologically attached to a
party and that their voting behavior discriminates between parties in a coalition
government. This creates conﬂict among parties in a coalition government, as
each party in government is induced to please the group it represents, but not the
groups its coalition partners represent. If the parties merge, voters become unable
to discriminate between them. As stressed by Bawn and Rosenbluth (2002), the
idea that voters can discriminate between parties in a coalition government, but
not between groups inside a single party, may be at the core of why coalition
governments behave diﬀerently than single-party majorities.
Timing and equilibrium The timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst
stage, the parties in government set policy. In the second stage, voters observe
the policy and vote. An equilibrium of this two-stage game is:
a) a policy optimally selected by the parties in each possible government,
taking into account the expected equilibrium outcome at stage b).
b) an election outcome, given the equilibrium economic policy and the type of
government.
In the next two sections, we treat the number of parties as exogenous and
analyze policy choices by single party and coalition government under proportional
and majoritarian electoral rule, respectively. In section 5, however, we use a simple
example to analyze the incentives of parties to merge under the two electoral rules,
thereby endogenizing party structure and the type of government.
3. Policy choices under proportional electoral rule
Under proportional elections all voters belong to a single national district and the
electoral formula is proportional representation. Thus, each party receives a seat
share in the next legislature identical to its vote share in the national district.
Hence, the expected seat share and vote share coincide, E(sP
G)=E(vP
G), and
our assumption about seat-share maximization can be represented as expected
vote-share maximization.
7Single party government We ﬁrst analyze policy choices by single party gov-
ernment. Given the symmetry of the model, it does not matter whether the
opposition consists of a single party or two distinct parties. To ﬁxi d e a s ,w ea s -
sume that there is a single party in the opposition. Suppose that party P =1 2 ,
is in government and Party P =3 4is in the opposition. Consider a voter in any
group J =1 ,..,4. Pick a voter in this group with a value of ωi exactly equal to
V J − V ∗J − δ. By (2.4), this “swing voter” in group J is just indiﬀerent between
voting for the party in government or voting for the opponent. All voters of the
same group with a lower value of ωi vote for the party in government. Let F(·)
denote the cumulative distribution function of ωi in (2.4). The fraction of voters
in group J voting for the party in government is thus F(V P −V ∗P −δ), while the
complementary fraction 1 − F(V P − V ∗P − δ) votes for the opposition.
T h eo v e r a l lv o t es h a r eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n tp a r t yi st h u sg i v e nb y :
v
P
S =
1
4
[
4 X
J=1
F(V
J − V
∗J − δ)] , (3.1)
where we have multiplied the sum by 1/4 because each economic group constitutes
a quarter of the electorate.
As ωi has the same uniform distribution in each group, F(ω)=1
2 +φω.R e c a l l
also that the expected value of the popularity shock δ is zero, at the time policy is
set. After some simpliﬁcations, the expected vote share for party P thus reduces
to:
E(v
P
S)=
1
2
+
φ
4
4 X
I=1
(V
J − V
∗J) . (3.2)
Thus, the expected vote share of the single party in government depends linearly
on the weighted indirect utilities of all voters with all groups receiving the same
weight, φ. This weight is the density of the distribution of idiosyncratic reservation
utilities; it measures within-group mobility and hence the response of the expected
seat shares to economic policy.
Equilibrium policy results from the maximization of (3.2) with regard to all
policy instruments, subject to (2.1) and (2.2). It is easy to see that this policy
corresponds to the social optimum in (2.3) because all groups have the same
weight.
8Coalition government To analyze the case of a coalition government, we as-
sume (without loss of generality) that parties 1 and 2 form a coalition government,
while parties 3 and 4 are in the opposition. Consider the voters in group J = P,
where P =1 ,2 is one of the two parties in government. By the same argument as
above, the fraction of voters in group J = P voting for party P is F(V P−V ∗P−δ),
while the complementary fraction 1 − F(V P − V ∗P − δ) votes with equal proba-
bility for each of the opposition parties. The vote share for each party in coalition
government (P =1 ,2) becomes:
v
P
C =
1
4
[F(V
P − V
∗P − δ)+
1
2
4 X
J=3
F(V
J − V
∗J − δ)] . (3.3)
Of the terms between square brackets, the ﬁrst reﬂects the share of voters in group
P whose reservation utility is satisﬁed, and the second the share of satisﬁed voters
from other groups (J =3 ,4). As the latter split their vote equally between the
two parties in the governing coalition, the second term is multiplied by 1/2. Note
t h a te a c ho ft h et w op a r t i e si ng o v e r n m e n tr e c e i v e st h ev o t e so fa l lt h es a t i s ﬁed
voters in its own group, but none of the satisﬁed voters in the group represented
by the coalition partner. It is this feature of voters’ behavior that pits the electoral
interests of the two coalition partners against each other .
Given our assumptions on the distribution of reservation utilities, the expected
vote share (seat share in the next legislature) for party P reduces to:
E(v
P
C)=
1
4
+
φ
4
[(V
P − V
∗P)+
1
2
4 X
J=3
(V
J − V
∗J)] . (3.4)
Note that the groups represented by a party in government receive twice the
weight of the groups in the opposition.
We then derive the equilibrium policy. Party P =1 ,2 in the coalition gov-
ernment sets gJ,J= P, so as to maximize (3.4), subject to (2.1) and (2.2) and
taking as given the policy choice of his coalition partner. Since both parties in
the coalition government agree over spending on the groups not represented in
government, it is irrelevant who sets it; we thus let either of P =1 ,2 optimize
with regards to gJ,J6=1 ,2. Moreover, the policymaking incentives are identical
independently of whether the opposition consists of one or two parties.
9The resulting optimality conditions for spending imply:7
g
∗J
C =
½
H−1
g [1
2] if J =1 ,2
H−1
g [1], if J =3 ,4 . (3.5)
Retrospective voting induces opportunistic politicians to enact a suboptimal allo-
cation of local public goods, relative to the choices of a social planner or a single
party government. The groups represented in government have an advantage, and
spending on the local public good beneﬁting them is above the social optimum:
g∗J
C > ˆ gJ = H−1
g (1),J=1 ,2. Intuitively, the disproportionate electoral response
by its own voters induces each party in government to give them more weight.
Since coalition members choose local public goods unilaterally, these electoral con-
cerns give rise to a common-pool problem: the necessary ﬁnancing comes out of
taxes levied on all groups, and the resulting electoral losses are partly borne by
the coalition partner. As a result, both parties in government overspend on their
constituencies. Conversely, the economic groups not represented in government
(J =3 ,4) receive the eﬃcient amount of public goods although they pay higher
than optimal taxes. Intuitively, the parties in government agree to give less weight
to groups 3 and 4 because electoral support in these groups is less sensitive to their
welfare compared to their “own” constituency.
Coalition governments thus behave very diﬀerently from single party govern-
ments. The reason is that coalition governments face a conﬂict within government,
because each party is eager to satisfy more its own voter base. This conﬂict is not
present with single party governments.
To be sure, we are not stating that single party governments behave more eﬃ-
ciently because conﬂict inside the party is addressed more eﬃciently than conﬂict
inside government. In our model, there is no conﬂict at all over policy inside
a single party in government. As voters cannot discriminate between diﬀerent
politicians under the same political banner, the electoral interests of these politi-
cians are aligned. When instead the government is supported by diﬀerent parties
that run separately in elections, voters can discriminate and induce an electoral
competition inside government. .
Of course, we could introduce other ineﬃciencies of policy formation for both
types of government. This would remove the social eﬃciency of policy under single
party government. But the basic insight, about the absence of electoral conﬂict
7In deriving (3.3), we use (2.1) and (2.2) which imply that ∂V
J
∂gI = Hg(gJ) − 1/4 for I = J,
and ∂V J
∂gI = −1/4 for I 6= J.
10inside single party government, and the presence of unavoidable electoral conﬂict
inside coalition government, is general and robust.8
We can summarize the above discussion as follows:
Proposition 1
Under proportional electoral rule, the overall level of government spending is
higher under coalition governments than under single-party governments. Coali-
tion governments spend more on programs favored by the groups represented in
government. Spending on programs favored by opposition groups are the same
under the two types of government.
4. Policy choices under majoritarian electoral rule
Under majoritarian elections, we assume that voters are distributed in a con-
tinuum of single-member districts, and the electoral formula in each district is
plurality rule. Thus, each district has one seat in the next legislature, and the
seat is won by the party with the highest vote share in that district. In the event
of a tie, a coin is tossed between the parties with the same vote share in the
district.
We assume that the distribution of economic groups is the same in all districts.
Because of the ﬁrst-past-the-post feature of majoritarian elections, the expected
seat share of a party depends on the number of other parties competing in the
election, whether they are in the government or in the opposition. Hence, we
index the expected seat share by the overall number of parties in the legislature,
N, and denote it by E(NsP
G). The possible party conﬁgurations are N = II, III,
IV.
Single party government Consider ﬁrst a government supported by a single-
party majority, say P =1 2 .I n a t w o - p a r t y s y s t e m (N = II), the single-party
incumbent wins the whole legislature if its vote share exceeds 1/2. If instead the
opposition consists of two parties (N = III), then the incumbent wins the whole
legislature if its vote share exceeds that of the largest opposition party. Under
8If politicians were not opportunistic, but instead motivated directly by all aspects of policy
(e.g., as ”citizen candidates”), there would be a conﬂict between the legislators inside a single-
party government. But the diﬀerences between single-party and coalition governments induced
by voting behavior would still remain. With conﬂicting interests between legislators in merged
parties, it would also be central to model within-party bargaining (and its diﬀerences from
within-coalition bargaining).
11our symmetry assumption, all votes lost by the incumbent party are split equally
among the two parties in the opposition. Hence, the incumbent wins if its vote
share exceeds 1/3. This implies that the expected seat share in the next legislature
for the single party in government is:
E(Ns
P
S)=Prob[v
P ≥ N¯ vS].
where II¯ vS = 1
2 and III¯ vS = 1
3.
Recall that δ has a uniform distribution with mean 0 and density ψ. Using
(3.3), we can rewrite the expected seat share of the single party in government as:
E(Ns
P
S)=
1
2
+(
1
2
−N ¯ vS)
ψ
φ
+
ψ
4
4 X
J=1
(V
J − V
∗J) . (4.1)
This expression is similar to equation (3.2) under proportional elections, except
( i )t h a tt h ed e n s i t yφ of the idiosyncratic reservation utility ωi is replaced by
the density ψ of the popularity shock δ; (ii) the presence of second term in the
right-hand-side, which depends on the overall number of parties in the legislature.
But the new term enters as a constant, so that the number of parties in the
opposition does not inﬂuence policy decisions. Speciﬁcally, one can verify that
the equilibrium expressions for gJ
S are identical to those in (2.3) for a single-party
government under proportional elections.
Coalition government What happens when parties 1 and 2 are in a coalition
government? The two parties in government always have the same vote share:
since the random popularity shock δ aﬀects these two parties in the same way,
equation (3.3) implies that Nv1
C = Nv2
C. Moreover, since all electoral districts are
homogenous, either the two parties in government win the whole legislature, or
the opposition wins the whole legislature, depending on the realization of δ.I ft h e
two parties in government win, a coin is tossed to award the seat to one of them,
district by district. With a continuum of districts, in equilibrium each winning
party in government ends up with half the seats in the legislature.9
9The reader may wonder why, then, the coalition parties do not strategically agree to split
the districts among themselves running only an electoral cartel with a single coalition candidate
in each district. But in our simple model, these agreements would not be self-enforcing. To
satisfactorily address this issue, a richer model is needed.
12This argument implies that the expected seat share of party P =1 ,2 in a
coalition government, is:
E(Ns
P
C)=
1
2
Prob[Nv
P
C ≥ N¯ vC] . (4.2)
Repeating the same argument as in the previous subsection, and recalling that
votes are split equally between the two parties in government, we have IV¯ vC = 1
4
if the opposition is split, and III¯ vC = 1
3 if the opposition consists of a single party.
Using (3.3) and the distributional assumption about δ, we then obtain the
expected seat share in the next legislature, for a party in a coalition government:
E(Ns
P
C)=
1
4
+(
1
4
−N ¯ vC)
ψ
φ
+
ψ
4
[(V
P − V
∗P)+
1
2
4 X
J=3
(V
J − V
∗J)] . (4.3)
Again, the number of parties in the opposition only aﬀects the size of the sec-
ond term on the right-hand-side. Given that the latter is also a constant, the
optimal policy choices of a coalition government also do not depend on the num-
ber of parties in the opposition. Moreover, the relative weights of the diﬀerent
group voters in (4.3) are the same as under proportional elections — cf. (3.4).
Because of this, the equilibrium allocation of spending coincides with that under
proportional elections. In equilibrium, a coalition government under majoritarian
elections thus sets gJ
C according to (3.5) in Section 3. In other words, when elec-
toral districts are homogenous, coalition governments make the same spending
decisions, independently of the electoral rule.
Combining this with the earlier result for single party government, we thus
have a sharp and testable prediction, summarized in the following:
Proposition 2
E q u i l i b r i u mp u b l i cs p e n d i n go n l yd e p e n d so nt h et y p eo fg o v e r n m e n t(coalition
vs. single party), as described by Proposition 1, and not directly on the electoral
rule or the number of parties in the opposition.
5. Electoral rules and party formation
So far we have taken the number of parties and the type of government as given.
But the electoral rule is likely to inﬂuence the number of parties and, through
this channel, the type of government (coalition vs. single party) and ultimately
ﬁscal policy. In this section we extend the model to illustrate this indirect eﬀect
of electoral rules.
13Extending the model Modelling the whole chain of causation, from electoral
rules to party system to type of government to economic policy, is a diﬃcult and
ambitious goal. Unavoidably, we have to make a number of simplifying assump-
t i o n s ,a n dt h ee x t e n s i o np r e s e n t e di nt h i ss e c t i o ni sm u c hm o r ea ne x a m p l eo ft h e
forces at work than a general theory. In particular, we neglect strategic voting:
voters continue to behave retrospectively as discussed above. We also simplify
the problem of government formation when there are multiple parties. The ex-
tension instead focuses on strategic behavior at the party formation stage, where
politicians trade oﬀ the electoral advantage of being a large party, against the
short term beneﬁt of remaining independent, in terms of political rents when in
government. This trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by the electoral rule: plurality rule increases
the electoral advantage of large parties, which induces politicians to merge into
bigger parties. Plurality rule thus facilitates the emergence of a two party system
through strategic behavior of politicians, despite the absence of strategic behavior
of voters.
We thus add an initial stage of party and government formation to the model
presented above. At the outset, the legislature consists of four groups of legislators,
numbered from 1 to 4, each representing one of the economic groups in the model.
These four groups of legislators make a simple choice: whether to form a group-
speciﬁc party, or merge into a larger party with another group. Once this choice
is made and we have a party system, a government is formed, policy is set and
ﬁnally elections are held, according to the rules described in previous sections.10
For simplicity, we assume that each political group has an initial seat share
of 1/4. The decision whether to merge or remain split is made strategically by
these groups, taking into account subsequent equilibrium outcomes. We simplify
the strategy space by only allowing mergers between groups 1 and 2, and groups
3 and 4, respectively. Given the symmetry between groups, this assumption is
not restrictive in the sense that any combination of two parties would lead to the
same qualitative predictions. But we also exclude mergers between more than two
parties.
For a merger to take place, both groups must agree; if not, they form separate
parties. If political group J remains a party on its own, its expected continuation
10The assumption of four primitive groups in the legislature is not restrictive. We could
instead have assumed the initial legislature to consist of two or three parties, allowing them to
splinter into smaller group-speciﬁc parties. Nothing of substance would change in this alternative
formulation and the same set of equilibrium party systems would result with suitable changes
in notation.
14payoﬀ coincides with that of the group-speciﬁc party. If instead two political
groups merge, each one expects to receive one half of the expected continuation
payoﬀ of the merged party. Three outcomes are thus possible: a two-party system,
(P =1 2and P =3 4 ) , a four-party system (P =1 ,2,3,4), and a three-party
system (P =1 2 ,3,4, or P =1 ,2,34).
Once we have a party system, a government is formed. We postulate an ex-
ogenous stochastic process for government formation. Any government needs the
support of at least half the legislature. In line with our assumptions about party
formation, we only allow governing coalitions, when relevant, between parties 1
and 2, or between parties 3 and 4. We thus rule out minority governments, as
well as surplus coalitions, by assumption.11
To create a trade-oﬀ in the choice of whether to merge, we must also add a
beneﬁt from being in government (as opposed to just being in the legislature).
Let RG be the value to any party from being in a government of type G,r e l a t i v e
to the value of expected seats in the next legislature (as before G = C,S denotes
coalition or single party government). Then, the expected payoﬀ of party P in a
government of type G is:
NW
P
G = RG + E(Ns
P
G) , (5.1)
while its expected payoﬀ out of government is simply its expected seat share, given
that it is in the opposition
NW
P
O = E(Ns
P
O) , (5.2)
where the index O refers to a party out of government. Throughout, we treat the
beneﬁt of being in government as exogenous. We also assume that RS < 2RC :
the total value of being in coalition government for two small partners exceeds the
value of being in single-party government for a large party. A previous version of
the paper (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2003) derived the value of oﬃce from an
endogenous policy choice over political rents by the government, and obtained that
RS < 2RC. This assumption is in line with the common pool problem analyzed
in this paper and reﬂects the idea that each party in the coalition can unilaterally
grab rents for itself.
11Taking minority governments seriously would require specifying a richer model of policy
formation than the one coinsidered below. In particular, we would have to take into account
the strategic interactions in the legislature, given the speciﬁc rules for government breakup and
formation. Laver and Shepsle (1996) and Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003) provide detailed
game-theoretic analyses of government formation, but neglect most of the remaining political
interactions (party formation, policy formation, and elections).
15A four-party system is an equilibrium if — taking into account the expected
equilibrium outcome of subsequent stages — the groups of legislators representing
economic groups I and J ﬁnd it optimal to remain split, given that the other two
groups have also decided to stay split. Equilibrium conditions for a two-party, or
a three-party, system are formulated in an analogous way.
Proportional elections First, we examine incentives to merge under propor-
tional electoral rule. To derive the equilibrium party system, we need to compute
the expected payoﬀs accruing to each party under all possible party conﬁgura-
tions, under the assumptions spelled out above. In the appendix, we show that
the expected payoﬀst oas m a l lp a r t ya r et h es a m ei naf o u r - p a r t ys y s t e ma si na
three-party system, and given by:
IVW
P =
1
4
+
1
2
RC . (5.3)
Under our assumptions on government formation and party formation, the proba-
bility of a coalition government made of say parties 1 and 2, is the same irrespective
of whether parties 3 and 4 have merged or not. Likewise, given proportional elec-
tions, the expected seat shares of parties 1 and 2 do not depend on whether or
not parties 3 and 4 have merged, and are always equal to 1/2 in equilibrium.
The expected payoﬀs to a large party (resulting from the merger of two political
groups), also derived in the appendix, are the same under a two party system as
in a three-party system, and given by:
IIW
P =
1
2
+
1
2
RS (5.4)
and the intuition is the same as above.
Under the rules spelled out above, when two small parties merge they each get
half the expected utility accruing to a large party. Hence, we have a four party
equilibrium if IVWP > 1
2IIWP, and a two party equilibrium if the inequality
holds in reverse. But under our assumption about the relative values of being in
coalition vs. single party government, RC > 1
2RS and the right hand side of (5.3)
is always larger than half the right hand side of (5.4). Hence, remaining small is
a dominant strategy for all parties:
Proposition 3
In a proportional electoral system, the unique equilibrium outcome has four
parties represented in the legislature. As a result, only coalition governments are
observed.
16Because the joint rents in a coalition government of two small parties are more
than double the rents enjoyed by a single-party government parties do not merge.
But the electoral rule plays an important role too: as PR makes vote shares equal
to seat shares, merging yields no particular advantage by extending the voter base.
Majoritarian elections We now turn to party formation and government for-
mation under majoritarian elections. The appendix gives the expected payoﬀst o
small and large parties under all possible party conﬁgurations. Since large parties
have an electoral advantage under plurality rule, these payoﬀs now depend both
on party size and on the overall number of parties in the legislature. This creates
at r a d e - o ﬀ between the rents captured if in government (that pushes parties to
remain small), vs. the electoral advantage of being a large party (that pushes in
the opposite direction). Depending on which eﬀect prevails, we can have either a
two party system or a four party system.
A four-party equilibrium arises if all groups of legislators prefer to remain split
rather than to merge, given two group-speciﬁc parties on the opposition side.
More precisely, using the above notation, a four-party system is an equilibrium if
IVW
1 ≥
1
2
IIIW
12 . (5.5)
The left-hand side of (5.5) is the expected payoﬀ of party 1 in a four-party sys-
tem. The right-hand side of (5.5) is the expected payoﬀ accruing to group 1 if it
merges with party 2, given that the opposition remains split and the payoﬀsa r e
divided equally between the merging groups. Given the symmetry of the model,
if condition (5.5) holds for party P =1 , it also holds for all the other parties.
Exploiting the results in the appendix, condition (5.5) can be re-written as:
RC ≥
1
2
RS +
1
6
ψ
φ
. (5.6)
If this condition is met, a four-party system is an equilibrium under majoritarian
elections.
Conversely, a two-party system is an equilibrium if all groups prefer to merge
rather than to remain split, given that the two opposition groups have also merged:
1
2
IIW
12 ≥ IIIW
1 . (5.7)
The right-hand side of (5.7) is the expected payoﬀ to group 1 of remaining a
group-speciﬁc party when the opposition groups have merged. The left-hand side
17of (5.7) is the expected payoﬀ accruing to group 1 if it merges with group 2:
the term IIW12 is divided in half because each group gets half the party payoﬀ
resulting from the merger. Exploiting the results in the appendix, condition (5.7)
for a two-party equilibrium is just the reverse of condition (5.6) above.
We thus have:
Proposition 4
Under majoritarian elections, the equilibrium is unique. If condition (5.6)
holds, the equilibrium has four parties and coalition government. If condition (5.6)
is violated, then the equilibrium has two parties and single-party government.
Thus, a two-party equilibrium is more likely to exist if ψ/φ = Std(ω)/Std(δ) is
large. Tis is the case if aggregate voter mobility is large relative to within-group
voter mobility. This makes intuitive sense. If aggregate voter mobility is large
(Std(δ) small), the election outcome is very uncertain. The electoral advantage
of a large party facing two small parties is then very signiﬁcant which raises the
incentive to merge.
Here, we have assumed that the distribution of voters is homogeneous across
electoral districts. In a previous version of the paper, we examined a more general
case where the distribution of voters may vary across districts, such that some
parties have a skewed distribution of their voters across districts. In that formu-
lation, the conditions for a two party equilibrium are less easily satisﬁed and a
three-party equilibrium is also possible. Intuitively, the gains from merging are
lower the higher the degree of heterogeneity. Take the extreme case where group
1 is only represented in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ed i s t r i c t sa n dg r o u p2 only in the other
half of the districts. In that case, groups 1 and 2 have no incentives to merge
given that this would give no extra seat shares to the merged party as compared
to the coalition of both groups. On the other hand, the costs of the merger would
still be there.
Empirical predictions Let us conclude the theoretical part of the paper by
summarizing the empirical implications of our results. According to Propositions
3 and 4, the equilibrium number of parties and hence the incidence of coalition
governments are smaller under majoritarian elections. According to Proposi-
tions 1 and 2, overall government spending is always larger under coalition
governments than under single-party governments, and the electoral rule aﬀects
spending only via its eﬀect on the incidence of coalition governments.
At a general level, these predictions rhyme well with a general idea in the
18political-science literature, namely that proportional elections go hand in hand
with “representativeness” and majoritarian elections go hand in hand with “ac-
countability”. But the predictions are sharper than these general insights and give
clear guidance on how to take the model’s implications for party structures, types
of government, and economic policies to the data. Indeed, the model predicts
that the type of government shapes government spending, while — given the type
of government — the electoral system does not exercise any direct eﬀect on gov-
ernment spending. However, the electoral system shapes the type of government
via the party system, and thus exercises only an indirect eﬀect on government
spending.
6. Data
We limit the empirical investigation to parliamentary regimes as in the model.
In deﬁning parliamentary forms of government, we follow Persson and Tabellini
(2003) who use the existence of a conﬁdence vote for the executive as the main
basis for distinguishing between parliamentary and presidential democracies.
We use two diﬀerent data sets:1) a broad cross sectional data base assembled
and presented in detail by Persson and Tabellini (2003), 2) another data base
resulting from a collaborative data collection eﬀort with political scientists from
Åbo Akademi (see Lundell and Karvonen, 2003). Both combine ﬁrst-hand in-
formation from constitutional documents with second-hand information from a
variety of sources.
Our ﬁrst data set includes 50 parliamentary democracies where each observa-
tion is an average of annual data over the period 1990-98. We include a country
in the sample if the average of the Gastil indexes of political rights and civil lib-
erties (denoted gastil)in the 1990-98 period does not exceed 5 (low values being
associated with better democratic institutions).
Our second data set covers the period 1960-98 for 40 parliamentary democ-
racies. Here, we rely mainly on the Polity IV data that goes farther back and is
more comparable over time than the Gastil data. The encompassing polity index
assigns to each country and year an integer score ranging from -10 to +10 (higher
values are associated here with better democracies). We restrict the panel to coun-
tries and years with positive values of polity (censored observations are treated as
randomly missing). Persson and Tabellini (2003) provide further details on our
19sample selection criteria.12 The resulting variable is called polity_gt.
Electoral rules In the model, the most important aspect of the electoral
system is the electoral formula. We rely on the binary indicator variable maj,
used in Persson and Tabellini (2003). The indicator is coded 1 for countries relying
exclusively on plurality rule in the elections to the lower house, and 0 otherwise.
A few parliamentary democracies rely on a mixed-majoritarian electoral system,
with some version of plurality rule in certain districts and proportional rule in
o t h e r s . W ec o d et h e s em i x e ds y s t e m sw i t ht h ev a r i a b l esemi, t a k i n gav a l u e
of 1 if the electoral system is mixed, and 0 otherwise. The default is thus the
group of proportional countries. Mixed-proportional systems such as Germany,
for which the electoral formula is strictly proportional at the level of the whole
nation, are coded as proportional. The model also assumes that proportional
elections are performed in a nation-wide district and majoritarian elections in
single-member districts. We include the variable district to allow for the positive
expected association between large districts and party proliferation. This standard
district magnitude variable measures the number of seats awarded in the average
electoral district, rescaled to vary between 0 and 1.
These three variables vary both across countries and over time but the time
variation is small: there are only seven electoral reforms relevant enough to change
our classiﬁcation of maj or semi, including two mid-1980s reforms in France (that
switched from majoritarian and then back to proportional) and the mid 1990s
reforms in Japan and New Zealand (both replacing a form of plurality rule with
a mixed electoral system). District magnitude varies more frequently over time,
a l t h o u g ht h es i z eo ft h e s ec h a n g e si so f t e ns m a l l .
Party structure Our simpliﬁed model has only three possible outcomes:
two, three or four parties. To normalize real-world party structures into a compa-
r a b l em e a s u r e ,w eu s et h es t a n d a r dH e r ﬁndahl-like index of party fragmentation.
It is labeled party_frag and deﬁned as 1−ΣP(sP)2, where sP is the seat share of
party P and the summation runs over all parties in the legislature (lower house).
As an alternative measure, we also use the number of parties in the lower house,
nparties.
12For a few small countries, the Polity IV data are not available. We thus interpolate Polity
IV with the Freedom House data to make an out of sample prediction. See Persson and Tabellini
(2003).
20Types of government Our simple model only allows for two types of gov-
ernment: single-party majority and coalition governments, minority governments
are excluded. We follow the model, and we classify these types of government
through simple indicator variables, called single and coalition, respectively, omit-
ting minority government. Thus, single t a k e sav a l u eo f1i ft h eg o v e r n m e n t
consists of single-party majority in that year and country, and 0 otherwise. Of
course, single and coalition do not always sum to 1 for any given country and year,
since we do observe minority governments in reality. When we take the average
of these two indicator variables, we obtain two incidence measures: coalition mea-
sures the incidence of coalition governments over the relevant time period, and
likewise for single. As an alternative measure of government type, we use the
number of parties in the governing coalition, ngov.
Other constitutional variables It is helpful to measure some other fea-
tures of the constitution likely to inﬂuence the party structure or the type of
government. In some electoral systems a party has to overcome a minimum elec-
toral threshold to gain representation in the legislature. We call this variable
threshold, and measure it as a percent of the total vote at the national level. A
higher threshold is expected to reduce party-fragmentation. We also construct
(0,1) indicator variables for three additional constitutional features: investiture,
set to 1 if a new government must win majority support in an investiture vote;
constructive, set to 1 if the government can be dismissed only by electing a re-
placement; bicam, set to 1 if the legislature has two chambers (irrespective of
their relative strength). Bicameralism raises the probability of surplus coalitions
(since it increases the majority required to form a government or to pass legisla-
tion), and thus we expect it to have a positive eﬀect on the incidence of coalition
governments and a negative one on single-party governments. The investiture
vote and the constructive vote of no conﬁdence reduce the probability of minority
governments, and thus, for a given party structure, are expected to increase the
incidence of coalition governments, but have no expected eﬀect on single-party
majority governments — see, in particular, the recent work by Diermeier, Eraslan,
and Merlo (2003a and b). When time periods are deﬁned as the whole legislature
in our panel data, we also measure the length of the legislature, leg_length,i n
years, to control for diﬀerent durations of legislatures.
Economic and social variables To measure the overall size of govern-
ment, we rely on central government spending as a percent of GDP, cgexp, used
21in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and based on data from the IMF.13 Since gov-
ernment spending is aﬀected by many other determinants, we also control for
several variables that reﬂect the economical, political, geographical, and histori-
cal characteristics of the countries in the sample. The following variables refer to
economic and social determinants of ﬁscal policy or of political outcomes: open-
ness to international trade, measured as exports plus imports over GDP (trade),
population size measured in logs (lpop), the percentage of the population above
65 years of age (prop65), the log of real per capita income (lyp), the output gap
(ygap), measured as the log-deviation of output from the country speciﬁct r e n d
(only in the panel data), a measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (avelf).
These variables have been shown to correlate with measures of ﬁscal policy in pre-
vious studies, such as Cameron (1978), Rodrik (1998), and Persson and Tabellini
(2003).
Because many majoritarian countries are former British colonies and colonial
history may have an independent eﬀect on the political and economic outcomes,
we typically control for British colonial origin. Because the inﬂuence of colonial
heritage is likely to fade over time, we weigh colonial origin by the time since
independence, giving more weight to colonial history in young independent states
and no weight at all to colonial rule more than 250 years ago. The colonial history
variable is called col_uka. Finally, since spending refers to central government,
we also use an indicator variable for federal political structures (federal).
The results reported below are robust to alternative speciﬁcations involving
these control variables. To save on degrees of freedom, we generally include con-
trols only when they are statistically signiﬁcant, or when we have strong priors
that they really belong to the speciﬁcation
Table 1 displays means and standard deviations of the main variables of in-
terest, in majoritarian, mixed and proportional electoral systems. Each obser-
vation corresponds to a particular legislature in a country in the 1960-98 panel.
The statistics are computed from pooling these observations. Most observations
are either classiﬁed as majoritarian or proportional. We immediately ﬁnd large
diﬀerences between these two systems in line with the theory. Compared to pro-
portional systems, majoritarian electoral systems have a less fragmented party
system, a smaller incidence of coalition governments, and a larger incidence of
single party government. The smaller incidence of coalition governments is in-
deed associated with smaller government spending. Outcomes in the few mixed
13The original IMF data contain some breaks in the series and inconsistencies, that were
corrected by Persson and Tabellini (2003).
22electoral systems lie in between the polar types. Interestingly, 63% of the ob-
servations from majoritarian systems exhibit single-party government, whereas
the incidence for proportional systems is only 17%. Taking our model literary,
the residual presence of coalition governments under majoritarian elections might
reﬂect the heterogeneity of districts in a subset of countries. Note also that the
standard deviation of the type of government is large within each class of electoral
rules, suggesting that there may be independent shocks to coalition formation, a
feature not present in our model (see further below).
7. Empirical results
We now show that more careful statistical analysis conﬁrms the simple message
of Table 1 and provides support for the precise predictions of our model.
Political outcomes First, we study the predictions of the theory concerning
the political variables, asking how party structure and type of government vary
with electoral rules. Second, we study the economic policy predictions, asking how
government spending is aﬀected by the type of government, given how the latter
varies with the electoral system (and other aspects of he constitution). Since we
have relatively few observations, we keep the speciﬁcation with regard to other
v a r i a b l e sa sp a r s i m o n i o u sa sp o s s i b l e .
Do electoral rules shape the party structure, as measured by party fragmenta-
tion (party_frag)o rb yt h en u m b e ro fp a r t i e s( nparties)? Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 2 display the results for the 1990s cross section. Here, we control for UK
colonial origin, country size, and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. As expected,
plurality rule (as measured by maj) is associated with less party fragmentation
and fewer parties. Mixed electoral systems also appear to generate less fragmented
party systems (compared to the proportional default). As expected, larger elec-
toral districts (typical of proportional elections) are associated with a more frag-
mented party system and a larger number of parties. Finally, higher electoral
thresholds reduces the number of parties, but only when the dependent variable
is nparties. In column 6 for the cross section based on the longer time series, we
have fewer observations, so we use a slightly more parsimonious speciﬁcation. The
results show that PR as well as larger electoral districts raise party fragmentation.
Our model suggests that the electoral system inﬂuences the type of government
only through its eﬀect on the party structure. To test this prediction, we estimate
the eﬀect of party structure on the type of government by two-stage least squares,
23imposing the exclusion restriction that the electoral rules variables maj, semi and
district do not appear in the second stage for the type of government. Because
we have an additional variable (threshold) measuring diﬀerent aspects of electoral
systems than maj, semi and district, and given that the latter three variables
are not highly mutually correlated, we can test the over-identifying restriction
implied by this exclusion restriction. To control for other determinants of the
type of government, we add our measures of bicameralism, the investiture vote
and the constructive vote of no conﬁdence to the second stage.
The results are displayed in columns 3-5 (for the 1990s) and 7-8 (for the long
c r o s ss e c t i o n )o fTable 2. Party fragmentation has a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the type of government, with the expected sign, and the number of parties in the
legislature have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of parties in government. The
estimated coeﬃcients of the party structure variables on the type of government
are precisely estimated, and their size is similar across the two samples, a sign
of robustness. Moreover, the test statistics (displayed in the row labelled Over-
id) do not reject the over-identifying restrictions that the electoral-rule variables
have no direct eﬀect on the type of government, except in the case of coalition
governments in the 1990s, where we marginally reject at the 5% conﬁdence level.
These results also give some comfort against the risk of misspeciﬁcation. As
mentioned in connection with Table 1 ,t h eo b s e r v e dv a r i a t i o ni nt h et y p eo fg o v -
ernment within electoral rules suggests stochastic shocks to government forma-
tion. Such shocks might be systematically correlated with electoral rules, through
strategic decisions in government and/or party formation. To address these is-
sues properly, would require a more general model, incorporating a non-trivial
strategic analysis of government formation. Our general inability to reject the
over-identifying restrictions reassures us that neglecting these issues does not bias
our inferences too much.
We now look at the time variation in the data. On the one hand, this is more
demanding, as electoral rules only exhibit limited variation over time. There have
been a few reforms of electoral formulas, generally towards a mixed system from
both extremes (plurality and strict proportionality) and mainly in the 1990s, while
reforms of district magnitude have been somewhat more common. On the other
hand, using the time variation is also more rewarding, because simultaneity bias
due to omitted (time-invariant) confounding variables is less likely.
We conﬁne the analysis to the 1960-98 data set, deﬁning a time period as a
whole legislature (see Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 2004 for additional results
when time is measured in calendar years). Legislatures correspond to our the-
24oretical model, in the sense that our political and institutional variables remain
constant (in practice, for party structure or type of government, or by deﬁnition,
for the electoral rules variables). Since almost all the reforms are clustered in the
two most recent decades, we include at most the six latest legislatures in each
country.
Panel-data estimation raises a new issue because our endogenous variables —
party structure and the type of government — move slowly over time. To cope with
this aspect of the data, we generally include a lagged dependent variable in the
speciﬁcation. However, as the endogenous variables reﬂect unobserved country-
speciﬁc determinants, we also we want to include ﬁxed country eﬀects. But it
is well known that ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates are biased in the presence of lagged
dependent variables and with only six observations per country in the panel this
bias can be quite serious. We therefore estimate by GMM in ﬁrst diﬀerences, as
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), using lags of dependent and endogenous
v a r i a b l e sp l u se x o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e sa si n s t r u m e n t s . 14
Column 9 in Table 2 shows our estimates of the eﬀect of electoral rules on
party fragmentation. Here, we include lagged party fragmentation, and control for
country size (measured by lpop) and quality of democracy (measured by polity_gt),
since many countries in the sample have become better democracies in more recent
periods. As expected, district magnitude raises party fragmentation, conﬁrming
the cross sectional results. Plurality rule (measured by maj) has the expected
negative sign, but is at best borderline signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.11). We cannot
reject the assumptions of no second-order serial correlation or validity of the lagged
values used as instruments.
Columns 10 and 11 report on the structural estimates for the type of gov-
ernment. We treat party fragmentation as endogenous and use the electoral-rule
variables (in ﬁrst diﬀerences) as additional instruments (beyond one additional lag
of the dependent variable and one lag of endogenous party fragmentation). The
estimated coeﬃcients on party fragmentation are signiﬁcant with the expected
sign: more fragmentation increases the likelihood of coalition governments and
reduces the likelihood of single-party majorities. Moreover, we cannot reject the
14This method produces consistent estimates even if the error term has ﬁrst-order serial cor-
relation, and makes eﬃcient use of the instruments. But it makes some demanding assumptions
on the validity of the instruments. Because of the uncertain ﬁnite-sample properties of GMM
estimators with many overidentifying restrictions, we choose a parsimonious set of instruments,
exploiting only one extra lag of dependent or endogenous variables (rather than the full set
of lags to the beginning of the sample). Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2004) also report on
ﬁxed-eﬀect, IV estimates on the basis of yearly data. The results are quite similar.
25over-identifying assumptions on the validity of the instruments, meaning that the
electoral rule variables do not exert a direct eﬀect on the type of government.
These panel estimates are less precise than the cross-sectional estimates. Ev-
i d e n t l y ,t h e r ei sc o n s i d e r a b l et i m ev a r i a t i o ni nt h et y p eo fg o v e r n m e n t ,w h i c h
cannot be easily explained by sluggish electoral rule variables. Nevertheless, the
estimates conﬁrm our earlier inference and give further support to the predictions
of the model.
Policy outcomes We now turn to the second set of predictions, concerning the
eﬀects on the size of government spending (as measured by cgexp). Throughout,
we control for the economic, social, historical and geographic variables listed above
such as federalism, demographics, and British colonial origin; the speciﬁcation is
a bit more parsimonious in the 1960-98 sample, because we have fewer degrees of
freedom and because some controls are not available over this longer time period
(see the notes to Table 3 for details). The results are very robust to alternative
speciﬁcations of the set of controls.
Columns 1 and 5 of Table 3 present reduced-form estimates of the eﬀect of
electoral rules on the size of government, for the 1990 and the 1960-98 samples
respectively. To save on degrees of freedom, we omit the variable for mixed elec-
toral systems (semi) as well as the constitutional variables, bicam, investiture
and constructive for the 1960-98 sample. District magnitude (district)h a sa
very strong positive eﬀect on the size of government, as expected. Plurality rule
(maj) also has the expected (negative) eﬀect, but the estimated coeﬃcient is not
statistically signiﬁcant. We omit the electoral threshold variable, as it is never
statistically signiﬁcant.
In columns 2-4 and 6-7 we estimate the eﬀect of the type of government on
government spending, treating the type of government as endogenous to electoral
rules. We also ask whether the eﬀect of electoral rules operates only through
the type of government. The instruments for the type of government are the
electoral-rule variables as displayed in columns 1 and 5, respectively, plus the
investiture vote variable when the type of government is measured by coalition,
and the electoral threshold variable when it is measured by the number of parties
in government.15 The estimated eﬀects of the type of government on government
spending are strongly signiﬁcant with the predicted sign. The coeﬃcients are
15Given the caveats above, we prefer not to use the constructive vote variable as an instrument,
although its inclusion makes no diﬀerence. Here we also skip the intervening step of the party
structure, regressing the type of government directly on the electoral rule variables.
26not very precisely estimated, but the point estimates are large enough to keep
them comfortably away from zero, except in one case. Finally, we cannot reject
the over-identifying restrictions, that the electoral rule variables have no direct
inﬂuence on government spending, beyond their indirect inﬂuence through the
type of government.
Despite the failure to reject the over-identifying restriction, a possible criticism
of these regressions is that none of the electoral rule variables is a valid instru-
ment, because countries might self-select into alternative electoral rules based on
unobserved features correlated with government spending.16 This concern was at
the core of the empirical analysis of Persson and Tabellini (2003). That book
estimates the eﬀect of the electoral rule on reduced form, as in columns 1 and
5, by a variety of methods, such as instrumental variables, a two-step Heckman
procedure, and propensity-score methods. The conclusion of that research eﬀort
is that the electoral rule appears to be exogenous to government spending, and
OLS estimates of reduced forms yield very similar results to those obtained by
all the other estimation methods. If correct, that conclusion ought to dispel any
concern about the validity of the electoral rule as an instrument for the type of
government.
To gauge the quantitative importance of electoral reform, consider a reform
from PR to plurality rule in a country drawn at random. According to the data
displayed in Table 1, this is associated with a higher incidence of coalition gov-
ernments on the order of 0.3 (0.55 - 0.24). According to the estimate in column
2 ,t h ee x p e c t e di n c r e a s ei ng o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n gi st h u so nt h eo r d e ro f5 %o f
GDP. This is a large eﬀect, but it is almost identical to the reduced-form eﬀect
estimated by Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) for a broader set of democracies.
T h el a s tt h r e ec o l u m n so fTable 3 report our panel estimates of how the type of
government and electoral rules inﬂuence government spending. Here, we measure
overall government spending in the last year of the legislature (rather than on
average throughout the legislature), to allow the political variables to exercise their
full eﬀect. As our GMM estimates are based on diﬀerenced data, the dependent
variable becomes the change in spending from the end of the previous legislature
to the end of the current one.
Since the duration of legislatures varies across countries and time periods,
these regressions include a variable measuring the length of the legislature, in
years. One lag of spending is also included in the speciﬁcation. The speciﬁcations
16The Sargan test of the over-identifying restrictions assumes that at least one of the instru-
m e n t si sv a l i d .
27always include other time-varying determinants of government spending, such as
the output gap (to measure cyclical inﬂuences on government spending), openness
to international trade, and the proportion of the elderly in the population. Finally,
to reduce collinearity among the electoral rule variables, we omit the indicator
variable for mixed electoral rules, including only the indicator for plurality rule
(maj) and the measure of district magnitude (district).
Column 8 shows the estimate of a reduced form of spending on the electoral rule
variables. As expected, district magnitude has a positive and strongly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient (larger districts implying more spending) but the coeﬃcient on plurality
rule is insigniﬁcant.
Columns 9 and 10 displays the structural estimates of the type of government
(coalition or single party majority) on government spending, when the type of
government is endogenous and the electoral rule variables of column 8 are used
as additional instruments. The estimated coeﬃcients all have the expected sign:
coalition governments spend more, single party majority governments spend less.
The eﬀect of coalition governments in column 9 is precisely estimated and large
in value. Given the coeﬃc i e n to nl a g g e ds p e n d i n g ,t h ei m p l i e dl o n g - r u ne ﬀect is
10% of GDP. Note that the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected. The
eﬀect of single-party government in column 10 is smaller and much less precisely
estimated.
All in all, the panel estimates are a bit more fragile than the cross-sectional
estimates, but this is perhaps to be expected given the paucity of electoral re-
forms. The overall picture emerging from all of our estimates is quite consistent
and support the predictions of our model. They suggest that coalition govern-
ments indeed spend signiﬁcantly more than single-party governments. Moreover,
proportional electoral rules cause larger government spending than majoritarian
electoral rules, but only indirectly by inducing more fragmented party systems
and hence more frequent coalition governments.
8. Concluding remarks
When the government is supported by a single-party majority, voters cannot easily
discriminate at the polls between diﬀerent politicians in government. Therefore,
the main electoral conﬂict runs between government and opposition. A coalition
government allows voters to cast their ballots for either of the coalition parties,
and this creates electoral conﬂicts within the government coalition. This intra-
government conﬂict induces higher spending under both electoral rules. When
28the number of parties is exogenously given, our model predicts that government
spending depends only on the type of government, but not on the electoral rule.
This is not the end of the story, however. Plurality rule gives an electoral
advantage to larger parties, since they are more likely to gain plurality in each
district. For this reason, politicians have stronger incentives to merge into a large
party under plurality rule, whereas they prefer to splinter in many smaller parties
under proportional rule. This strategic behavior of politicians has obvious impli-
cations for the type of government. Under plurality rule, we are more likely to see
governments supported by single party majorities, whereas coalition governments
are more likely under proportional rule. Our model thus predicts that the eﬀect
of the electoral rule on government spending is indirect and works via party and
government formation.
To illustrate these two ideas in a simple way, we have relied on simplifying
assumptions, which restrict the feasible alliances among politicians and simpliﬁes
the behavior of voters. But we are conﬁdent that the main insights of the paper
are robust to alternative modeling assumptions.
Empirical evidence, based on the observed variation across parliamentary
democracies and across time in connection with electoral reforms, strongly sup-
ports the theoretical predictions. Proportional rule is indeed associated with more
fragmented party structures, which in turn lead to more frequent coalition gov-
ernments, which spend more than single-party majority governments. Moreover,
the electoral rule does not seem to exert direct inﬂu e n c en e i t h e ro nt h et y p eo f
government, nor on the size of government spending. The chain of causation in
the data appears to coincide with the causal chain predicted by the theory.
We have conﬁned the theoretical and empirical analysis to the overall size
of government spending. But the diﬀerence between coalition and single-party
governments emphasized in this paper is likely to inﬂuence other economic policy
dimensions, such as the size of budget deﬁcits or the composition of spending and
taxation. Moreover, other dimensions of electoral rules than those emphasized
in this paper may similarly inﬂuence policies, directly or indirectly. One should
therefore be cautious in drawing strong policy conclusions from our analysis about
the general desirability of an electoral system over another.
299. Appendix
9.1. Party payoﬀs under proportional electoral rule
Here we compute the expected party payoﬀs under proportional elections, for all
possible party systems.
Suppose that the legislature consists of four parties P =1 ,2,3,4. Given the
r u l e so fg o v e r n m e n tf o r m a t i o n ,o n l yc o a l i t i o ng o v e r n m e n t sa r ep o s s i b l ei nt h i sc a s e :
coalitions of parties 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, are formed with the equal probability,
1
2.
By (5.1) and (5.2), the expected utility for any of these parties, at the start of
the government formation stage, is thus:
IVW
P =
1
2
£
RC + E(IVs
P
C)
¤
+
1
2
E(IVs
P
O) . (9.1)
With probability 1/2, party P is in a coalition government in the current period,
earning an expected utility given by the ﬁrst square-bracketed term; with proba-
bility 1/2, the party is out of government in the current period, earning expected
utility given by the second term.
Under proportional electoral rule, the expected seat share coincides with the
expected vote share for each party. Moreover, the equilibrium expected vote
share can easily be computed from the expression (3.4) in section 3. Since in
equilibrium V J = V ∗J for all J,.(3.4) immediately implies that, in a four-party
system, E(IVsP
C)=E(IVsP
O)=1 /4. As seen from the government formation stage,
the expected equilibrium votes share is the same for the parties in government and
opposition. The right hand side of (9.1) then simpliﬁes to:
IVW
P =
1
4
+
1
2
RC . (9.2)
Consider a two party system, P =1 2 , 34. Only single party governments are
possible, with equal probabilities, 1/2. By (??), the expected utility of a generic
party P, at the start of the government formation stage, is:
IIW
P =
1
2
£
RS + E(IIs
P
S)
¤
+
1
2
E(IIs
P
O) . (9.3)
The ﬁrst term is the expected utility of party P when in government, in the current
period, and the second term is its expected utility when out of government. Using
30the results in section 3, in equilibrium E(IIsP
C)=E(IIsP
O)=1
2. Hence, the right
hand side of (9.3) simpliﬁes to:
IIW
P =
1
2
+
1
2
RS . (9.4)
Finally, consider a three-party system, say P =1 2 , 3a n d4 . T h e nb o t h
a single-party government and a coalition government are possible, with equal
probabilities, 1/2. Here the parties diﬀer, and we have to keep track of their
identity. The large party, P =1 2 , c a no n l yb ei nas i n g l e - p a r t yg o v e r n m e n t ,s o
his expected value of being in government is 1
2RS. Moreover, the expected seat
share of a large party is always equal to 1/2, irrespective of the number of parties
in the legislature. Thus it follows that the expected payoﬀ of a large party is
t h es a m ea si nt h et w o - p a r t ys y s t e m ,IIIWP =II WP, for P =1 2 , as given by
the expression in (9.4). By similar reasoning, the smaller parties, P =3 ,4, can
only be in a coalition government, and their expected payoﬀ i st h es a m ea si n
a four-party system IIIWP =IV WP as given by the expression in (9.2). All in
all, the number of parties represented in the legislature does not matter for the
parties’ expected payoﬀs.
9.2. Party payoﬀs under majoritarian electoral rule
Here we compute the parties’ expected payoﬀs under all possible party conﬁgura-
tions with majoritarian electoral rule.
Suppose that we have four parties: P =1 ,2,3, and 4.T h eg o v e r n m e n tc a ne i -
ther be a coalition of parties 1 and 2, or of parties 3 and 4, with equal probabilities.
Using the expressions for expected seat shares derived in section 4, in equilibrium
(i.e. for V J = V ∗J), we have that for all values of P : E(IVsP
C)=E(IVsP
O)=1
4.
The expected payoﬀ of any party P, at the start of the government formation
stage, is thus identical to that under proportional elections and four parties, and
is given by (9.2) above.
I nt h ec a s eo ft w op a r t i e s ,P=1 2and 34,only single-party governments are
possible, both with equal probabilities, 1/2. Using the expressions derived in
section 4, their equilibrium expected seat share in the next legislature are the
same in government and opposition: E(IIsP
S)=E(IIsP
O)=1
2. Once more, then,
the expected payoﬀ of any party P coincides with that under proportional elections
and two parties, and is given by (9.4) above.
Finally, suppose we have a legislature with three parties, say P =1 2 , 3 and
4. Then, both single-party governments and coalition governments are possible,
31with equal probabilities, 1/2. But the expected equilibrium payoﬀsa r en ol o n g e r
the same for all parties in the legislature.
Suppose that the small parties are in government. Using (4.3) in section 4,
their equilibrium expected set share is N¯ sC = 1
4 +( 1
4− N¯ vC)
ψ
φ. As discussed in
section 4, in a three party system N¯ vC =1 /3. Hence, the equilibrium expected
seat share of a small party in government, when facing a single large party in the
opposition, is17:
E(IIIs
P
C)=
1
4
−
1
12
ψ
φ
. (9.5)
Since the seats lost by government parties are gained by the opposition, we must
also have that the equilibrium expected seat share of the single party in the
opposition is:
E(IIIs
P
O)=2 ( 1− E(IIIs
P
C)) =
1
2
+
1
6
ψ
φ
. (9.6)
Suppose instead the large party is in government. By (4.1), its equilibrium
expected seat share is N¯ sS = 1
2 +(1
2− N¯ vS)
ψ
φ. With N¯ vS =1 /3, this simpliﬁes to
E(IIIsP
S)=E(IIIsP
O), as given by the right hand side of (9.6). Repeating the same
analysis for the small parties in the opposition, we also get that their expected
equilibrium seat share when in the opposition are:E(IIIsP
O)=E(IIIsP
C), as given
by the right hand side of (9.5). Thus, the expected equilibrium seat share of any
party only depends on its size, and not on whether it is in government or in the
opposition. Moreover, under plurality rule, large parties gain at the expenses of
small parties.
Based on these results, it is straightforward to compute the overall expected
payoﬀs of a small party before the government formation stage in a three party
system as:
IIIW
P =
1
2
RC +
1
4
−
1
12
ψ
φ
,P =3 ,4 . (9.7)
The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 9 . 7 )i st h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ of being in
government, the last two terms correspond to the expected equilibrium seat share.
Similarly, the expected payoﬀ of a large party before the government formation is
(the interpretation is the same):
IIIW
P =
1
2
RS +
1
2
+
1
6
ψ
φ
,P =1 2. (9.8)
17Since the expected seat share must lie between 0 and 1, we must have: 3φ ≥ ψ
32Of course, this diﬀerence between the expected welfare of the small and large
parties in a three-party system reﬂects the extra electoral bonus for a large party
facing two small parties under plurality rule.
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Table 1 
Political and economic outcomes 
in alternative electoral systems 
 
  Majoritarian Mixed Proportional   
      
party fragmentation  0.54 
(0.17) 
0.54 
(0.12) 
0.70 
(0.09) 
     
coalition governments  0.24 
(0.41) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.55 
(0.47) 
     
single-party governments  0.63 
(0.47) 
0.40 
(0.50) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
     
government spending  25.94 
(9.05) 
33.45 
(11.3) 
35.12 
(9.30) 
     
N.  obs.  138 7 187 
Simple averages;  standard deviations in parenthesis.   
Observations pooled across countries and legislatures.  Table 2   Party Structure, type of governments and electoral rules   
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Controls included in OLS: cols (1)-(2): avelf, lpop, col_uka, col (6) 
lpop, col_uka. Second-stage variables in 2SLS, cols (3)-(5): avelf, lpop, col_uka, bicam, investiture, constructive, cols (7)-(8)  lpop, col_uka, investiture, constructive. First-stage 
variables in 2SLS: maj, semi, district, threshold, and all second-stage variables. Specification of GMM (all variables in first differences) in cols (9)-(11), always includes 
constant, lpop; polity_gt , and lagged Dep. var., once in col (9), twice in cols (10)—(11)..  Instruments for lagged Dep. Var. is one additional lag of this variable.  In cols 
(10)-(11), party_frag is treated as endogenous with additional instruments: one lag of party_frag,  maj,  district,.and threshold.. Over-id is Hansen-Sargan  test statistic of 
over-identifying restrictions, chi-2(df) critical values at 5% significance 7.81(3),  12.59(6).. AR(2) is Arellano-Bond test for absence of second-order serial correlation. 
                       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dep. Var.  party_frag                      nparties coalition single ngov party_frag coalition single party_frag coalition single
                  
party_frag                       
              
       
                 
                
                 
                 
               
                 
             
                 
               
               
                 
                  
                 
                   
                  
              
                     
2.01 -2.78 2.62 -2.63 1.35 -1.26
  (0.71)***
 
  (0.50)***
 
(0.74)***
 
  (0.43)***
 
(0.81)*
 
(0.63)**
  nparties  0.25 
  (0.10)**
  maj  -0.12 -2.10 -0.09 -0.06
  (0.05)** (1.31) (0.05)* (0.04)
semi  -0.22 -3.76 -0.01
  (0.09)** (2.23)*  (0.06)
district  0.11 3.20 0.14 2.31
  (0.07) (1.56)**  (0.07)** (0.24)*** 
threshold  0.00 -0.39 -0.01 -0.00
  (0.01) (0.16)**
 
  (0.01) (0.00)
bicam  0.15 -0.01 0.28 
  (0.11) (0.08)
 
(0.24)
investiture  -0.08 0.84 -0.10
  (0.12) (0.35)**  (0.11)
constructive 
 
0.53 0.19 0.78
(0.10)***
 
(0.33)
 
(0.12)***
   
Sample  1990s  
cross 
1990s 
cross 
1990s 
cross 
1990s 
cross 
1990s 
cross 
1960-98 
cross 
1960-98 
cross 
1960-98 
cross 
1960-98 
panel 
1960-98 
panel 
1960-98 
panel 
Estimation  OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM GMM
Over-id      7.91(3)**  4.33(3)  4.52(3)        4.16 (3)  3.70 (6)  3.70 (6) 
AR(2)                   0.68 0.46 0.46
N. countries 
(obs) 
52                 52 47 47 47 38 36 36 37
(141) 
35 
(97) 
35 
(97) Table 3    Size of government, type of government and electoral rules  
 
                      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
            
coalition                  
              
            
               
           
    4 . 0 6 ) *       
              
               
8 . 3 1            
4 . 5 3 ) *          
               
               
       1 2     
        0 . 1 7 )     
           
         
       
                   
                  
           
               
17.00 30.07 6.51
  (3.72)***
 
(10.79)***
 
(3.12)**
 
 
single  -17.17 -24.47 -1.79
  (5.58)***
 
(14. 97)
 
  (4.31)
ngov  7.74
  (
 
 
maj  -4.76 -2.73 1.08
  (3.39) (2.55) (1.67)
semi 
  (  
district  14.52 17.29 0.25
  (2.05)***
 
(2.29)***
 
(0.08)***
- 0 . threshold 
  (
lagged cgexp   0.53 0.46 0.66
  (0.21)**
 
  (0.18)**
 
  (0.17)***
   
Sample  1990s 
cross 
1990s 
cross 
1990s 
cross 
1990s 
cross 
1960-98 
cross 
1960-98 
cross 
1960-98 
cross 
1960-98 
panel 
1960-98 
panel 
1960-98 
panel 
Estimation  OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM GMM
Over-id  2.16(3) 2.26(2) 0.02(2) 1.29(2) 1.60(1) 5.35(3) 10.24(9) 7.11(9)
AR(2)  0.76 0.52 0.96
N. countries 
(obs.) 
46 46 46 46 34 34 34 34
(111) 
32 
(105) 
32 
(105) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS specification, col (1), and second stage of 2SLS, cols (2)-(3) 
include: lyp, trade, prop65, federal, avelf,  col_uka.  OLS, col (4), and second stage 2SLS, cols (5)-(8), include: lyp, prop65, federal, col_uka. First-stage in 2SLS: as displayed in cols 
(1), (4) plus investiture (cols 2 and 6) and threshold (col 4), plus all second-stage variables.  GMM specification (all variables in first differences) includes: constant, lpop, 
prop65, ygap, leg_length.  In col (8), instrument for lagged lagged cgexp  is one further lag. In cols (9)-(10), type of government (coalition or single) is treated as endogenous 
with one lag of this variable plus maj, district, and threshold as instruments. Over-id is Hansen-Sargant test statistic for over-identifying restrictions distributed as chi-2(df); 
critical values at 5% significance 3.84(1), 5.99(2),  7.81(3), 16.92(9). AR(2) refers to Arellano-Bond test for absence of second order serial correlation. 